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Abstract
We analyze the effect of consumer information on firm pricing in a model where consumers search for
prices and matches with products.  We consider two types of consumers.  Uninformed consumers do not
know in advance their match values with firms, whereas informed consumers do. Prices are lower the
greater the proportion of uninformed consumers.  Hence uninformed consumers exert a positive externality
on the others, in contrast to standard results.  This leads to socially excessive investment in gathering prior
information when aggregate demand is price-sensitive.
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     1  Wolinsky's paper was written to provide insight into monopolistic competition.  See also Wolinsky
(1984) and Fischer (1993) for related approaches using Salop's (1979) circle model to describe product
differentiation. 
I - Introduction.
Economic intuition would suggest that informed consumers typically impart a positive externality
on uninformed ones.  Because firms compete more vigorously for informed consumers, the uninformed ones
will benefit through lower prices and/or higher product qualities.  Uninformed consumers can then free ride
on the informed ones; this suggests that consumers will underinvest in information gathering, as was pointed
out by Tirole (1988, p.108).  Several results in the literature bear out this intuition (see details below).  Our
intention in this paper is to show that there are important cases where informed consumers cause market
prices to rise, so that such consumers impart a negative externality on the informed ones.  Under these
circumstances, consumers will then overinvest in information gathering.  Along the way, we also develop
the theory of pricing in markets where consumers have imperfect information and must incur search costs
to improve their knowledge.  
Our starting point is a search model due to Wolinsky (1986).1  The idea is that consumers care
about more than just prices.  They also care about the products sold by firms.  Saturday afternoon shopping
at the mall is about finding low prices, but it is also about finding products that suit consumer tastes.  What
one consumer likes, another consumer may not like so much (clothes, shoes, television sets, stereos,
restaurant menus, red Cadillacs or blue Lincolns). That is, products are differentiated, and consumers value
the products sold by firms differently. The goods we consider are "search" (or "inspection") goods, whose
characteristics can be determined prior to purchase.  If indeed we accept that consumer tastes differ, then2
     2  There is a small literature on imperfect consumer information on matches and firm advertising. 
See for example Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Meurer and Stahl (1994).  
a consumer who finds a product at the price she anticipated may nevertheless continue to search for a good
that better matches her tastes.  This brings firms into direct competition with each other, and gets around
the Diamond (1971) paradox that, for homogeneous goods, the only equilibrium price is the monopoly one
if consumers must incur a search cost to find out the price charged by a firm.  It also means that consumers
do actually search in equilibrium, so providing a search model with search (there is no search in equilibrium
in Diamond).
This framework enables us to deal with differing degrees of information across consumers by
allowing some consumers to be uninformed as to their product matches, while others know exactly their
matches with particular firms.2  As we show, the greater the proportion of the latter, the worse off are the
former.  Loosely, this is because the informed consumers reveal their tastes by always first checking out
the price of the firm they prefer.  This behavior renders firm demands more inelastic (an informed consumer
will not check out another firm's product if the preferred firm's price exceeds the anticipated price by less
than the search cost) and increases equilibrium prices.  Hence the informed consumers impart a negative
externality on the others.  This means that consumers can overinvest in information if we allow for a prior
choice of whether to become informed about products.
The result that informed consumers impart a negative externality on uninformed ones is in sharp
opposition to what would happen if prior information were about prices rather than product characteristics.
The  literature  on  heterogeneous  search costs illustrates the effect of prior information on prices.
Heterogeneity in search costs is another way to avoid Diamond's (1971) monopoly pricing result and to3
     3  Other methods of circumventing the Diamond Paradox are described in Reinganum (1979),  Burdett
and Judd (1983), Bénabou (1989, 1992), Robert and Stahl (1993), and Stegeman (1989) (the last two
build on Butters, 1977).  See Stiglitz (1989) and Stegeman (1989) for surveys of the literature.
     4  Axell (1977) is a pioneering work in this area.  Stahl (1995) gives a detailed comparison of papers
that follow this route.  Carlson and McAfee (1983) introduce heterogeneity in both search costs and
production costs.
have consumers searching in equilibrium in a market for a homogeneous good (rather than heterogeneity
in tastes, as in Wolinsky, 1986), as in Rob (1985) and Stahl (1989, 1995).3  In these papers, prices are
kept down because there are enough shoppers whose search costs are zero or arbitrarily close to zero.4
These authors find that equilibrium prices may be less than the monopoly price and tend smoothly towards
marginal cost as the search cost distribution puts more weight in the neighborhood of zero.  These models
yield price dispersion, and those consumers who have low search costs keep searching if the prices quoted
to them are too high.  Hence, those with low search costs impart a positive externality on the others (a
related story is the "Bargains and Ripoffs" model of Salop and Stiglitz (1977), that has been popularized
as the "Tourists and Natives" model - see e.g., Carlton and Perloff (1994)).
Our result is also to be contrasted with models in which products are vertically differentiated and
some consumers are imperfectly informed of product qualities (but know prices).  Models in this vein
include Wolinsky (1983) and the version by Tirole (1988, Ch.2.3.1.1), and Bagwell and Riordan (1991),
where again a greater proportion of informed consumers benefits the uninformed ones.
In the next section we lay out the basic structure of the model and discuss the back-drop case of
zero search costs.  Section III describes the properties of equilibrium when all consumers face search costs
and do not know their product matches.  Section IV extends the analysis to allow for a fraction of
consumers who do know their match values in advance, and presents the negative externality result.  This4
     5  Our analysis is essentially static.  In particular, we do not allow for consumers to have information
from previous purchases, which would require a dynamic analysis.  Our model is best thought of as
applying to durable goods with purchases so far apart in time that any information from past purchases
is irrelevant.
     6  We are implicitly assuming here that search costs are nonmonetary.  The assumption that non-
purchase yields an arbitrarily low utility effectively means that each consumer's reservation price exceeds
y+c.  (The analysis is not fundamentally changed if search costs have a monetary component - see below.)
Note price will never exceed income in equilibrium.  In some cases price will equal income: we refer to such
result is elaborated in Section V, where the model is extended to allow for price-sensitive demands and
we show that the degree of investment in information is socially excessive.  Section VI concludes and offers
some further research directions.
II.  Preliminaries.
The models that follow share a common structure that we can develop at the outset.  There are two
firms,  1 and  2.  Each sells one variant of a horizontally differentiated product at price p i, i = 1,2.
Production entails constant marginal cost which is the same for both firms so that we can set it equal to zero
without loss of generality.  
Consumers incur a search (or sampling) cost c to check out a firm's product and price.5  Once a
firm has been sampled, recall is costless, meaning that no extra cost is incurred if a consumer buys from a
firm sampled earlier.  Thus search costs are 2c for a consumer who checks out both firms, regardless of
which product is bought; a consumer who stops at the first firm sampled pays only c in search costs.  Each
consumer has income y and will buy at most one unit of the good.  Any remaining income is spent on the
numéraire.  If a consumer does not buy, her utility is arbitrarily low, so she will always buy unless she
cannot afford to (that is, if price exceeds y).6  The total measure of consumers is one.5
cases as the Diamond Paradox.  Our primary interest is in the cases where the paradox does NOT hold.
In our formulation the problem noted by Stiglitz (1979) - that the market may fail to exist if the first search
is costly - does not arise.  In the Stiglitz version, firms charge the consumer reservation price, so that
consumers never buy because they would expect to pay a full price equal to the reservation price plus the
cost of the first search, and so never enter the market.  In our version, income caps the maximum amount
consumers will pay.
     7  The numeraire is purchased under perfect information.
(1)
Consumers differ in their valuations of the goods sold by the two firms.  Gross of any search costs,
consumer R's (indirect) utility conditional on purchasing good i at price pi is:
where y-pi is the amount of numeraire consumed and ,Ri is consumer R's match value with product i.7  A
fully-informed consumer will buy the product for which the realization of (1) is greatest.  The match values,
,Ri, are realizations of random variables that are identically and independently distributed across consumers
and firms, with a common density function f whose support is an interval [a,b] of the extended real line.
Let F be the corresponding distribution function.  We shall also assume:
A1: The density f is twice continuously differentiable and logconcave on  [a,b].
Logconcavity is a weaker requirement than concavity (but stronger than quasiconcavity), and is
satisfied by most commonly used densities (including the normal, the exponential and the double-
exponential; see Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991, for a more complete list).  Logconcavity implies the monotone




logconcavity of the joint density of match values guarantees the existence of a price equilibrium in the Perloff
and Salop (1985) model of oligopoly with differentiated products (see also Anderson, de Palma, and
Thisse, 1992).  We refer below to this model (which does not entertain search costs) as the benchmark
model.
The benchmark model is a limit case of ours, and it is useful for what follows to derive its symmetric
equilibrium price.  For two firms, and given the utility function (1) with no search costs, the demand facing
Firm 1 if it charges p1 while Firm 2 charges p* is 
A symmetric equilibrium price p* < y must satisfy
By symmetry, D1(p*,p*) = ½, and so the equilibrium price with no search costs, p*
n, is:
The following result is proved in Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992), using the analysis of Caplin and
Nalebuff (1991).
Proposition 1:  Under A1, if search costs are zero and y is above (resp. below) p*
n, there exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium price given by p*
n (resp. y).7
     8  There are also degenerate equilibria at which both firms set prices above y, so that no one buys.  In
such Nash equilibria, if consumers expect prices above y, they do not enter the market, so that firms have
no incentive to change their prices.  We ignore such equilibria in the sequel.  We show in a later footnote
that the only equilibrium (with prices no larger than y) is the symmetric one.  The existence of a unique,
symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium should be contrasted with models of heterogeneous search costs in
which there may be only asymmetric equilibria (e.g. Salop and Stiglitz, 1977, and Rob, 1985), or else only
equilibria in mixed strategies (e.g. Stahl, 1989, 1995).
Let us now return to the model with positive search costs.  We seek equilibria at which both firms
charge the same price.8  Since a consumer expects no gain from price differences when she searches, her
sampling behavior in equilibrium is entirely based on her information about her matches with products.  If
she is indifferent between sampling either firm, we assume that each is sampled with probability one half.
We consider two alternative assumptions on consumer information.  The first corresponds to Wolinsky
(1986).
(a)  Uninformed consumers.  The consumer does not know her realization ,R1 (,R2) unless she has
sampled Firm 1 (Firm 2).  She samples a first firm at random.  If she gets a low draw she then samples the
other firm if the expected utility gain exceeds the search cost.  She returns to the first firm if she realizes an
even worse utility value from the second firm. 
(b) Fully-informed consumers.  The consumer knows the realizations of both her match values in advance.
She expects  p1 = p2, so she first samples the firm for which  ,Ri is greater.
Section III  considers the pure case (a).  Section IV adds consumers of type (b), with a fraction
k of the latter.
In keeping with much of the literature, the equilibria considered throughout the paper are Perfect
Bayesian equilibria (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).  For firms, this simply means that each maximizes8
its profit given the anticipated price of the rival firm and consumer search behavior.  A consumer's
information set is characterized by the prices and match values already observed.  Each consumer
maximizes her expected utility at each information set, given her expectations of the unknown prices and
match values.  Price expectations are consistent with equilibrium strategies of firms and are unaffected by
prices already observed.  Hence if a consumer has sampled one firm and finds out that its price is different
from the equilibrium price, she follows an optimal search rule, still expecting the other firm to charge the
equilibrium price.
III.  Uninformed Consumers.
In this section it is assumed that no consumer knows her match value with a product until she
samples the firm selling it.  The model is basically that of Wolinsky (1986) with two firms.  Henceforth we
drop the subscript R on valuations to ease notation.
In order to calculate the symmetric equilibrium, we must find  Firm 1's demand (Firm  2's demand
is given in a similar manner).  We first need to characterize consumer behavior given the equilibrium price
p* is expected to prevail at each firm.  Half the consumers search Firm 1 first, and actually find its price
to be p1 (which is not necessarily equal to p*, since we must characterize consumer reactions to prices off
the equilibrium path) and match ,1.  If a consumer who starts at Firm 1 then searches Firm 2 (where she
correctly expects the equilibrium price p* to prevail), she will return to Firm 1 if  - p1 + ,1 > - p* + ,2, or -
) + ,1 > ,2, where ) / (p1-p*) is the premium charged by Firm 1.  Therefore the expected benefit from
searching Firm 2 is: 9
     9  If c were a monetary cost, the equilibrium price would simply be y-c.  The same comment applies to
the other models.




^ as the critical value of the lower bound of the integral such that a consumer holding x
^ is indifferent
between searching again and sticking with Firm 1.  Thus  x
^ is defined by:
(cf. Wolinsky, 1986, eq. 3).
It is readily verified that the left-hand side of (6) is continuous and decreasing in  x
^, is infinite at x
^
= -4, and is zero at x
^ = b, so that x
^ is uniquely determined, and consumers for whom ,1 - ) > x
^ will not
go on to search Firm 2 (for such consumers, (5) is less than c).  Hence a fraction  [1 - F(x
^ + ))] of the
consumers searching Firm 1 first stop there.  
Since x
^ is decreasing in c, fewer consumers search when the cost of search goes up.  Note also
that if x
^ < a-), then no consumer will search again.  Thus, if x
^ < a, no consumer would want to search
beyond the first firm unless she anticipated a large enough price difference.  In this case, the only equilibrium
is that both prices equal consumer income, y, since at any lower common price, either firm could increase
its price slightly without losing any customer.9  This is the Diamond Paradox.  We now study the model
when 
^ x > a.10
Firm 1 expects consumers who start at Firm 2 to find a price of p*.  When these consumers decide10
(7)
whether to go on and sample Firm 1, they face a problem similar to that of consumers who start at Firm
1, which we just analyzed.  Since they expect Firm 1 to play its equilibrium strategy, and thus to also charge
p*, the expected fraction of them choosing to stay with Firm 2 without further search is  [1- F(x
^)].  
For those who do search both firms, the indifferent consumer is defined by u1(p1) = u2(p2), or 
The partition of the (,1,,2) space is given in Figure 1, and the firms' demands can be directly
calculated from the Figure.  
LINSERT FIGURE 17
The square  [a,b] × [a,b] is divided into four rectangles. Each represents a different outcome for
a consumer's search strategy.  Area I (,1 > x
^ + ) and  ,2 > x
^) corresponds to consumers who stop at the
first firm sampled.  Those consumers who sample both firms no matter where they start are represented
by Area III (,1 < x
^ + ) and  ,2 < x
^).  Finally, Area II (Area IV) corresponds to consumers who sample
both firms if and only if they start at Firm 2 (Firm 1).
In order to derive Firm 1's demand, we also draw the indifferent consumer relation (7).  Consumers
who have sampled both firms and whose match value pair is below that line buy from Firm 1.  Thus Firm
1's demand comprises half the consumers in Area I, all consumers in Area II, and those in Area III who11
     11  There are some conceptual difficulties in formulating what an asymmetric equilibrium would look
like.  In particular, it is not clear what a consumer should believe when confronted with a deviation - or
even if she could detect a deviation if a firm deviates to its competitor's candidate equilibrium price. 
One way around the problem is to assume that a consumer finds out the identity of the firm only when
she samples it (so that she is a priori indifferent between checking out either firm); she can then also tell
if it has deviated.  Under this assumption, the unique equilibrium is the symmetric one by the following
argument.  Suppose there were an asymmetric equilibrium.  Then it would satisfy  D1 + p1 MD1 /Mp1 = 
D2 + p2 MD2/Mp2 = 0.  Since  D1 = 1 - D2, we have  MD1/Mp1 = - MD2/Mp1 = MD2/Mp2, and therefore 
(p1 - p2) MD1/Mp1 = D2 - D1.
Now, since  p1 > p2  ] D1 < D2, the only possible solution to the first order conditions has  p1 = p2. 
Similar analysis rules out one firm setting a price equal to y with the other firm setting a lower price; a




are below the dashed line:
where we recall that ) / (p1-p*), so that demand depends only on price differences.  Integrating by parts
and letting u = , - ), (8) can be rewritten as
(Note that these expressions hold no matter what the sign of ) is.)
A symmetric equilibrium price for the uninformed consumer model, pu* 0 (0,y), must satisfy (3)
with p* = p*
u (the subscript u denotes that all consumers are uninformed), so that1112
(11)
(12)
(cf. Wolinsky, 1986, eq. 16: thanks to the assumption that all consumers buy, we find an explicit solution
for the equilibrium price whereas Wolinsky's is in implicit form).
It is instructive to determine how the candidate equilibrium price evolves with the search cost.
Wolinsky (1986) notes that if match values are iid uniform (the case for which he proves the existence of
a price equilibrium) and under monopolistic competition, price is strictly increasing in the search cost.
Intuition would suggest that this should be the case more generally, at least under reasonable conditions.
As we now show, the "reasonable condition" here is the logconcavity of  1-F: 
Proposition 2:  Assume  f is differentiable on [a,b] and let  ^ x > a.  The price p*
u is increasing in c if
and only if 1 - F is logconcave on [a,b].  Furthermore,
which is the equilibrium price p*
n of the benchmark (no search cost) model (see (4)).
Proof:  The price pu* depends on the search cost c through ^ x (which is monotonically decreasing in c).
With f differentiable, dpu* /d^ x is well defined and has the sign of
This expression is negative over the whole interval if and only if 1-F is logconcave. Since f is differentiable,
it is continuous.  As c 6 0, ^ x 6 b, and (11) follows from (10).  Q.E.D.13
     12  Using the argument of Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995), first write
where the inequality follows from the logconcavity of  f (i.e., f'/f is increasing).  Hence  0 # f(b)f(x) #
f'(x)[1 - F(x)] + f²(x), so  1 - F(x) is logconcave (see also Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 1989, and Borell,
1975).
The condition shown in Proposition 2 regarding logconcavity of  1-F is related to our assumption
A1 by the following:
Corollary 1:  Under A1, the price p*
u is increasing in the search cost.
Proof:  Under A1 f is differentiable and logconcave on [a,b].  This guarantees 1 - F is logconcave,12  and
the result then follows from Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
The search cost in this model is the cost of getting more information.  As this cost rises, consumers are more
likely to stick with the first firm sampled.  This gives firms more market power and they raise prices
(Corollary 1).  Clearly consumers are better off with lower search costs.  They benefit from the direct effect
of being more likely to get a better match, and the indirect effect of lower prices.  Another type of cost of
getting better information is introduced in the next Section.  As we argue there, lower costs of pre-search
information on product matches (as opposed to the lower costs of search considered here) may actually
decrease consumer welfare.14
     13   The condition that f be strictly increasing is stronger than is required for these results, but this
condition renders tractable the analysis of existence of equilibrium for the (more complex) model of the
next section. 
The intuition behind the second part of the Proposition is that almost all consumers search both
firms when search costs are low, regardless of what they find first.  Since they can then costlessly recall the
preferred product, this is just as if there were no search costs (i.e., the benchmark model).  
The second part of Proposition 2 is important to the analysis of equilibrium existence that follows
because of the next result: 
Corollary 2:  Under A1, p*
u is greater than or equal to the symmetric equilibrium price, p*
n, of the
benchmark model of no search costs.
Proof:  By Corollary 1 and the observation that (11) is equal to (4).   Q.E.D.
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for p*
u to be an equilibrium price.13
Proposition 3:  Suppose A1 holds, f is increasing, and that all consumers are uninformed.  Then there
exists a unique single-price equilibrium:
(i)  If p*
u < y and 
^ x > a,  both firms charge  p*
u.  
(ii)  If p*
u $ y or  ^ x < a,  both firms charge  y.
(iii)  If p*
u < y and  
^ x = a, both firms charge  p if and only if  p 0 [1/f(a), y].15
(13)
  
The proof is in the Appendix.  Let us briefly discuss the case of high search costs.  As ^ x tends to a, the
right-hand side of (10) tends to 1/f(a).  Thus, if f(a) = 0, pu* goes to infinity as c goes to (E, - a) (see (6)).
This means that the equilibrium price hits the budget constraint of consumers for some ^ x > a.  In contrast,
if f(a) is sufficiently large (greater than  1/y), then the equilibrium price is pu* < y for c < (E, - a) (i.e. for ^ x
> a), and is equal to y for c > (E, - a).  Finally, the equilibrium price takes any value in [1/f(a),y] for c =
(E, - a).   To illustrate, consider the increasing exponential distribution, f(,) = exp[,] for , 0 [-4,
0] (so a = -4 and b = 0).  Here ^ x satisfies exp(^ x) -
^ x - 1 = c, and there are no restrictions on c.  The
equilibrium price is pu* = exp(-^ x), as long as this is less than y, and is y otherwise.  
IV. Informed and Uninformed Consumers.
We now consider what happens if the consumer population comprises a fraction 1-k of uninformed
consumers (like those considered in the previous Section) and k fully-informed consumers.  The informed
consumers know both valuations in advance.  The uninformed consumers know neither valuation until they
have sampled the firms.  Let  Du(p1,p*) as given by (9) be the average demand for Firm 1 by uninformed
consumers. Each of the informed consumers first checks out the firm where she knows she has a better
match.  Since consumers expect firms to set the same price, and by symmetry of the distribution of matches,
half the informed consumers initially check out each firm. They will not shift if the actual price observed is
less than c above what was expected.  Hence for p1 # p* + c the demand addressed to Firm 1 is:
and the candidate equilibrium price, if strictly below y, is given by p* = p*
k where  pk* is the common16
(14)
equilibrium price in the model with k informed consumers, so
This is just 1/(1-k) times the price p*
u as given in (10), so that if k = 0 we have the uninformed consumer
equilibrium, and as k 6 1, price goes to infinity so that the budget constraint eventually becomes binding
(we discuss this limit in more detail below).  We now extend Proposition 3 to allow for informed
consumers.
Proposition 4:  Suppose A1 holds, f is increasing, and that a fraction k of consumers are informed
of their match values.  Then there exists a unique single-price equilibrium:
(i)  If  p*
k  < y and 
^ x > a, both firms charge  p*
k.  
(ii)  If  p*
k $ y or  ^ x < a, both firms charge  y.
(iii)  If  p*
k < y and  
^ x = a, both firms charge  p if and only if  p 0 [1/(1-k)f(a), y].
Proof:  As in the proof of Proposition 3, it suffices for (i) to show that p*
k maximizes profit over the interval
[h,+4), where h / max{0, p*
k +a - ^ x} (for  0 # p1 < p*
k +a - ^ x, the demand from informed and uninformed
consumers is constant and profit is increasing in p1).  In the previous proof, it is also shown that under the
present assumptions,  Du is concave in  p1 if  p1 satisfies  ^ x + ) # b.  Furthermore, for  p1 # pk* + c (i.e.
for ) < c) the informed consumers' demand is constant.
We now show that ^ x+c is always less than b, and thus, for p1 # pk* + c, D1 is concave in p1 since17
(15)
it is the sum of two concave functions.  First note that ^ x+c = b for c = 0.  Using (6), the derivative of 
^ x+c
with respect to c is  1 + 1/[F(^ x)-1] # 0.  Hence ^ x+c # b for all values of c.  Since demand is concave for
p1 # pk* + c, profit is also concave and is maximized by pk* given by (14) for this range of prices.  We
now show that profit is decreasing for p1 > pk* + c and therefore reaches a global maximum at pk*.
The price p*
k defined by (14) is clearly larger than pu*.  Thus, using Lemma A.1 in the Appendix
(if demand depends only on the price difference, and profit is decreasing for prices above the rival's price,
then profit is decreasing for prices above the rival's price when the rival sets a higher price),  p1Du(p1,pk*)
is decreasing for p1 > pk* + c.  The demand from informed consumers is no longer constant: once they find
out that p1 is larger than pk* + c, some may decide to go to Firm 2.  For those who stay we must have  ,1 -
p1 > ,2 - pk*- c. Thus the informed consumers' demand is:
This is simply Firm 1's demand in the benchmark model with no search costs if Firm 2's price is p*
k + c (see
(2)).  Since p*
k > p*
u (for k > 0) and Corollary 2 shows that p*
u exceeds the benchmark price (for c > 0),
then so does  p*
k + c exceed the benchmark price  p*
n given in (4). We therefore know by Lemma A.1 that
Firm 1's profit from informed consumers must be decreasing in p1 for p1 > pk* + c.  Thus overall profit is
decreasing since it is a convex combination of two decreasing functions.  
The proofs for cases (ii) and (iii) are similar to those in Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
The sufficient conditions for existence are rather strong and they are clearly not necessary.  In
particular, the assumption that f is increasing ensures that Du is concave in own price, so that, since demand18
     14We assume c < 1 so that, from (6), x
^ = - lnc > 0. Otherwise we are in the Diamond paradox case
covered by Proposition 4(ii). 
from uninformed consumers is constant for prices less than c above the rival's price, overall demand is
concave for this range of prices, which renders profit concave as well.  To see what can go wrong for
decreasing densities (even though A1 is satisfied) consider the decreasing exponential, f(x) = e -x for x 0
[0,4).  The candidate equilibrium price is then simple to calculate; from (14) we have p*
k = [1/(1 - k)] (note
that this is independent of c since, by Proposition 2, p*
u is independent of c, as 1 - F is loglinear).  The
corresponding candidate equilibrium profit is simply 1/[2(1 - k)].  Now consider a deviation by one firm
to p*
k + c.14 To calculate the deviation profit, first note that Du, as given by (8) or (9), is (1/2)e-) with ) =
c.  This is the demand from uninformed consumers, while the demand from informed consumers is still 1/2
since price has been increased by less than c (and consumers find this out only when they sample the firm).
The deviation profit is thus
which exceeds the equilibrium profit if and only if
It is readily verified that this holds for k = 1/2 if c is sufficiently close to 1, so that p*
k is not an equilibrium
price for this case, and indeed it is not an equilibrium price for k large enough. Furthermore, if y > p*
k (as
in Proposition 4(i)), the profit derivative when both firms charge y, as given by (3) (for p* = y), is strictly19
     15 The price p*
k is also increasing in the search cost c under the assumptions of Proposition 2.
negative so that y cannot be an equilibrium price either (a slight decrease in price would be profitable). This
shows that no pure strategy symmetric equilibrium exists.
In order to guarantee that an equilibrium exists, demand from uninformed consumers must decrease
sufficiently fast when a firm raises its price so that such a deviation is not profitable, in spite of the extra
revenue extracted from the captive informed consumers.  An increasing density guarantees this even if there
is a large informed consumers population.  This is a strong sufficient condition, especially if informed
consumers are few.  For instance, it can actually be shown that with only uninformed consumers (k = 0)
and a decreasing exponential distribution of matches (as above), there is a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium as given by the candidate equilibrium expression (10), in which both firms charge 1.
Returning now (and henceforth) to the assumptions of Proposition 4, since p*
u > 0, the equilibrium
price (16) is clearly increasing in k:15 
Proposition 5:  Under the assumptions of Proposition 4(i), the equilibrium price is strictly increasing
in the fraction of informed consumers.
The result of Proposition 5 implies that the informed consumers impart a negative externality on the
uninformed ones.  That is, more informed consumers lead to higher prices.  The reason is that uninformed
consumers are the source of elasticity in demand - the smaller the fraction of them, the fewer customers will
be lost following a price hike.   20
This result is in stark opposition to the usual reasoning about the effects of informed consumers.
It is usually argued that there is too little investment in information gathering because the informed
consumers positively affect the uninformed ones, so the latter free ride.  Let us consider these arguments.
The major contexts in which information differences across consumers have been considered are the quality
choice model summarized in Tirole (1988) (which draws on Wolinsky, 1983), the quality-signalling model
of Bagwell and Riordan (1991), and the price dispersion model of Stahl (1989) and others.  In the quality
choice model, the issue is whether firms will produce high or low quality, for a given price that is observed
by all consumers.  Some consumers are informed about quality, while others are not informed until they
have purchased the good (so that quality is an experience characteristic for the uninformed consumers). 
For prices in a medium range, the greater the fraction of informed consumers, the greater the equilibrium
probability that firms produce the high quality.  In the quality-signalling model, quality is exogenous and
observed by only a fraction of consumers, and the firm uses its price (observed by all consumers) to signal
its quality.  A low-quality firm also has low cost, and so loses more profit at a high price than a high-quality
(and high-cost) firm.  The distortion in prices from signalling a high quality is greatest when there are only
uninformed consumers; the price for high quality falls as the fraction of informed consumers rises because
the benefit to a low-quality firm from mimicking the high-quality price is less.  
Prices are not observed in the Stahl (1989) model with heterogeneous search costs, but since some
consumers have zero search costs they are effectively informed about prices.  The more such consumers
there are, the more firms will compete for them, as manifested in lower prices in the equilibrium mixed
strategy.  In our model, observing price is costly to all consumers, and information differences pertain only
to matches.  In contrast to Stahl, in our model informed consumers shop less than uninformed ones (not21
     16  It can be even true that lower costs of pre-search information reduce overall consumer
surplus.  To take an extreme example, suppose that initially these costs are so high that no consumer
gets informed, and the price is that of the uninformed consumer model.  Then let the costs fall
sufficiently that all consumers decide to get informed.  Since the new equilibrium price goes to y,
consumers are all worse off in an ex-ante sense as long as y is large enough.
at all in equilibrium).  Fewer shoppers means higher prices in both models.  
To see that there is an externality to consumers in the collection of pre-search information in our
context, suppose that different consumers have different costs of gathering information.  The fraction of
consumers who will get fully informed is determined by the benefit of full information, which entails getting
the best match for sure and obviating any further search costs.  Although the information decision is
privately optimal, because each consumer does not take into account the adverse effect of her improved
information on prices, there will be too many informed consumers from the perspective of consumers
taken as a group.16
We now consider the limit case of k = 1 in more detail. In this case, all consumers know their match
values in advance, and they also know which firm sells which product.  This information is the undoing of
the consumers.  To see why, suppose that the consumers anticipate prices p1 and p2, one of them being
strictly less than y.  Each consumer then chooses the firm offering her the highest utility.  In equilibrium, she
is not disappointed and buys from the first firm sampled.  Thus a firm expects to be the best deal for a
consumer who samples it.  That consumer could either buy, or else incur the search cost and check out the
other firm.  Clearly, if the price of the first firm exceeds the anticipated price by some amount less than c,
she will still buy from it as long as the actual price does not exceed y.  Hence if the firm whose price is less
than y is sampled, it can raise its price by some small amount above the anticipated price without losing any22
customers.  Thus there is no equilibrium at which a firm sampled with positive probability has a price strictly
below y.  Since the firm with the lower anticipated price (below y) would always have some customers,
the only equilibrium outcome is for both firms to price at y.  
This discussion is summarized in: 
Proposition 6:  If all consumers are informed, the unique equilibrium outcome has both firms
charging y.
This is the analogue to the Diamond result for homogeneous goods, and arises here even though
products are heterogeneous.  Firms know that consumers will first sample the firm they like best, and
therefore that consumers would not switch if faced with a price slightly higher (but less than c higher) than
expected. The firms can use this information to extract as much surplus as is possible given the budget
constraint.
V.  Overinvestment in information with price-sensitive demands.
There are two notable restrictions in the analysis above.  The first is that the income level y has been
used to bound consumer spending from above, so that the price that corresponds to the Diamond paradox
is y.  The second is that the total surplus is independent of the price level.  This implies that total surplus per
uninformed consumer (and per informed consumer) is unaffected by increases in the fraction of informed
consumers, k, since the consumer surplus lost is exactly balanced by an increase in firm profits.  In this
Section we generalize the model to price-sensitive individual demands.  As well as constituting a useful23
     17  The optimal degree of prior information investment involves equating the benefit to informing one
more consumer with the extra cost - this is exactly the private incentive too.
(18)
broadening of the model, this extension effectively replaces the upper bound, y, with the monopoly price
on the individual demand curve.  Second,  once there is some elasticity in demand, an increase in k will be
seen to reduce social surplus per consumer for those whose prior information has not changed.  Since
demand is totally inelastic in the model above, the socially optimal degree of information investment (that
which maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and firm profits) is attained in equilibrium: higher prices are
simply a transfer from consumers to firms.17  When we extend the model to allow for price-sensitive
individual demands, each individual, once she chooses a product, buys an amount that depends (negatively)
on the price charged by the firm. Then the price rise that follows the information investment of an additional
consumer will cause total consumer benefits to fall by more than firm profits rise - there is a direct welfare
loss due to higher prices.  Thus there will be excessive investment in prior information from the social
welfare perspective.  
To introduce price-sensitivity, rewrite (1) as:
where v(pi) is the consumer's conditional surplus from buying good i.  We assume that v(.) is positive,
strictly decreasing, strictly convex and twice continuously differentiable on [0,! p] with v(p) = 0 for all p$ ! p
(so that ! p is the demand intercept). This surplus is associated with a conditional individual demand of q(pi),
which, by Roy's identity, is equal to -v'(pi).  That is, if a consumer buys good i, she buys a quantity q = -24
v'(pi) of it as long as - piv'(pi) < y (as assumed below).  Let 0(pi) (= q'(pi)pi/q(pi) < 0) be the elasticity of
the conditional demand function, with 0 strictly decreasing in price (as is standard for many demand
functions, such as linear demand: see also Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov, 1995).  Furthermore, let
there exist a finite price pm > 0 such that 0(pm) = -1: this is just the standard monopoly price and will be
shown to be the "Diamond price" (which firms will charge if no consumer searches).  We assume that
consumer expenditure at price pm is less than y (hence this is true at all relevant prices), so that income
constraints are never binding.
The convenient property of this formulation is that the revenue per consumer associated to the
(conditional) individual demand is concave in vi / v(pi).  Indeed, let R(vi) = piq(pi) denote this revenue
(where the dependence of pi on vi has been suppressed: recall that pi(vi) = v-1(vi)).  Hence R' = -(0+1),
which is negative in the relevant price range below the monopoly price, and R' is strictly decreasing since
0 is strictly increasing in vi.  Now, it suffices to note that any demand function D1 derived in the previous
sections constitutes the fraction of consumers buying from Firm 1 when the price variables are now
replaced by minus the conditional surpluses, i.e., consumers base their choices on surpluses. The previous
analysis is a limit case of this transformation, with v(pi) = r-pi and r (> y) a positive constant.   More
specifically, for the benchmark model with no search costs, a consumer will buy from Firm 1 if v1 + ,1
exceeds v* + ,2, where v* is the equilibrium conditional surplus level at Firm 2, so that the fraction of
consumers buying from Firm 1 is given by (2), with v* replacing - p* and v1 replacing - p1.  Likewise, the
consumer search problem is analogous to that of Section 3, and the consumer will search if ,1 - ) < ^ x,
where 
^ x is given by (6) and ) = v* - v1.  Thus ) is the expected conditional surplus premium from
switching to Firm 2.  The fraction of uninformed consumers buying from Firm 1 is then given by the right-25
(19)
(20)
hand side of (8) (equivalently (9)).
If we write Firm i's profit as Bi(vi, vj) = R(vi)Di(vi,vj), i,j = 1,2, i ￿ j, then we now seek a Nash
equilibrium at which the vi's are the strategic variables.  A symmetric Nash equilibrium now entails a level
of conditional surplus v* such that
(cf. (3)) so that all previous equilibrium expressions are now replaced with -R/R' on the left-hand side
(leaving the right-hand side unchanged). For the general case with a fraction k of informed consumers, the
equilibrium surplus value is the unique solution to (see (14))
Note that for the special case of totally inelastic demand, R = pi  and v(pi) = r-pi, so that R(vi) = r-v i, and
hence -R/R' = pi, as in (14).  Where demand has some elasticity, -R/R' is given by piq(pi)/(0(pi)+1), which
tends to infinity as pi tends to p m from below, so that price is always below the monopoly price.
Furthermore, since R is concave, -R/R' is a decreasing function of vi, and thus an increasing function of pi.
This means that the equilibrium price rises as the right-hand side of the relevant equilibrium expression
increases.  In particular, the equilibrium price rises with c if and only if 1-F is logconcave (see Proposition
2), and price is strictly increasing in the number of informed consumers (see Propositions 5 and 8).
Furthermore, the counterpart to Proposition 6 is that both firms charge pm when all consumers are informed
about their matches.  The following equilibrium existence result is proved in the Appendix. 26
Proposition 7:  Suppose A1 holds, f is increasing, a fraction k of consumers are informed of their
match values, and individual conditional surplus, v, has the properties given above. Then there
exists a unique single-price equilibrium:
(i)  If ^ x > a, both firms charge the price p(v*
k) = v-1(v*
k), where v*
k is given by (18).  
(ii)  If ^ x < a,both firms charge  pm  .
(iii)  If ^ x = a, both firms charge  p(v) if and only if  v 0 [v(pm),v*
k ].
In comparison to Proposition 4, the assumption of a downward sloping demand curve obviates the
need for the income constraint y.  If ^ x < a, no consumer searches and we have the Diamond paradox that
both firms charge the monopoly price pm.  In order to determine the welfare properties of the equilibrium,
it is useful to define the conditional total surplus, S, as the sum of conditional consumer surplus, v*
k, plus both
firms' equilibrium profits. (The full expression for total surplus also accounts for search costs, expected
match values, plus any cost of obtaining prior information as introduced below.)  
Proposition 8.  If ^ x > a, the equilibrium price p*
k. is increasing in the fraction of informed consumers,
k.  Hence conditional total surplus, S,  is decreasing in k. 
Proof: The right-hand side of (18) is increasing in k, so that v*
k is decreasing since -R/R' is a decreasing
function by the concavity of R in v.  Hence p*
k is increasing since v is decreasing in p.  The next step is to
show that S is decreasing in k, i.e. v(p*
k) - p*
kv'(p*
k) is decreasing in p*
k (where the term -p*
kv'(p*
k) denotes firm
revenues, which equal total profits given the equilibrium price is symmetric and the assumption of zero27
production costs). The derivative of S with respect to p*
k is simply -p*
kv''(p*
k), which is negative under the
assumption that v is strictly convex. Q.E.D.
The latter result is simply that deadweight loss increases in price when demand slopes down.  Here
this increase in deadweight loss implies that consumers who gather prior information exert a negative
externality.  With this result in hand, we can now address the suboptimality of prior investment in
information.  To this end, suppose there is a continuum of consumers and let us rank consumers in order
of increasing costs of gathering prior information. Let the cost for consumer k be N(k), which we assume
for simplicity to be continuous and strictly increasing in k.  Each consumer weighs her cost of obtaining prior
information against her private benefit b(c).  This benefit is positive and comprises the expected incremental
match value achieved plus lower expected search costs (since the consumer immediately goes to the firm
where she knows her match value is higher).  It is important to note that the benefit b(c) is independent of
k: although p*
k is increasing in k, any individual consumer's choice has a negligible effect on the equilibrium
price.  Hence the equilibrium value of k, denoted k*, is zero if N(0) $ b(c), unity if  N(1) # b(c), and
satisfies N(k*) = b(c) otherwise.  We are now in a position to prove:
Proposition 9: If k* 0 (0,1), there is excessive investment in prior information.
Proof.  The equilibrium condition is that N(k*) = b(c). Since N is increasing, for any k $ k* we have N(k)
$ b(c).  However, the marginal social benefit is always strictly below b(c) by Proposition 8 that total
conditional social surplus is strictly decreasing in k.  Hence the social optimum must involve a level of k28
strictly below k*. Q.E.D.
The equilibrium condition for investment in prior information is that the cost of getting the
information equals the expected benefit for the marginal consumer. This consumer takes into account neither
the effect on other consumers of her decision, nor the effect on firms' profits.  The other consumers are
worse off by the consequent price increase while the firms are better off.  However, since the equilibrium
is symmetric, there is no change in the matching process (except for the marginal consumer, whose decision
is privately optimal and can thus be ignored).  Since demand is price-sensitive, the loss in consumer surplus
from the  price increase exceeds the gain in firms' profit from moving closer to the monopoly level.  
VI.  Conclusion.
We have shown that consumers may overinvest in information about product characteristics
because each consumer does not account for the higher price that ensues from firms taking greater
advantage of the informed consumers.  An example of such an investment in information is the purchase
of travel guides.  In such guides, price information is often vague or unreliable (for instance most restaurant
guides do not provide information about the price of wine).  If travelers use such guides in order to pick
among various products of comparable quality (restaurants, hotels, etc.), when they actually start searching,
they are in a position comparable to that of the informed consumers of our model.  The model suggests that
the availability of such guides should lead to higher prices - the cheaper the guides, the higher the price.
In the same vein, tourist information bureaux can also be a way for localities to relax price competition
among local businesses, so firms would encourage such offices.  However these results depend on the29
existence of a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium which is proved under the rather strong sufficient
condition that the density of tastes is non decreasing.
In this paper we have considered consumers who are uninformed about prices and matches, and
consumers who are uninformed about prices only, with the result that the latter impart a negative externality
on the former.  One could also formulate models in which some consumers may be informed about prices,
in which case one would expect there to be positive externalities from informed consumers (see Stahl,
1989, for example).  Such differential information across consumers leads one to think about advertising.
Indeed, our result that profits rise with the number of informed consumers suggests that firms would want
to engage in product advertising.  Product advertising would benefit firms if they could commit not to
advertise prices at the same time.  However, firms are unlikely to be able to thus commit themselves, and
price advertising may end up destroying the advantages that product specification advertising creates. In
this context, one may ask whether product advertising or price advertising, or both, are used in equilibrium,




Lemma A.1:  Suppose Ba(p1) = p1
~ D(p1-pa) is decreasing in p1 for p1 $ pa $ 0, with 
~ D' # 0 whenever 
~ D
is positive.  Then for pb $ pa, Bb(p1) = p1
~ D(p1-pb) is decreasing in p1 for p1 $ pb. 
Proof:  By hypothesis, 
p1
~ D'()) + 
~ D()) # 0  or )
~ D'()) + 
~ D()) + pa
~ D'()) # 0 
for p1 > pa with ) = p1-pa.  Since pb > pa and 
~ D' < 0, it follows that 
)
~ D'()) + 
~ D()) + pb
~ D'()) < 0,  or p1
~ D'()) + 
~ D()) < 0 with )=p1-pb,
i.e., profit Bb is strictly decreasing for p1 > pb.  Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:  First consider case (i).  If Firm 1's price is p1 # pu + a - b, its demand is 1 - ½[1
- F(^ x)] (Firm 1 retains all consumers coming to it first as well as all those coming from Firm 2: 
^ x is the
highest match value with Firm 2 in the latter group).  Thus, for this range of prices Firm 1's profit is linear
and increasing in p1.  Let h / max{0, p*
u + a - ^ x}.  To show that p*
u maximizes profit on œ+ it now suffices
to show that it maximizes profit on  [h,+4).  Taking the second derivative of (9) with respect to  p1 we
have: 
Thus if fN is nonnegative on [a,b], D1 is concave in p1 for prices at least equal to  h, such that  ^ x +
) #  b.  Thus p*
u maximizes profit for this range of prices.  
For  ^ x + ) > b, (8) can be rewritten as:
which is the same as (2), i.e., Firm 1's demand in the benchmark model with no search costs when Firm
2's price is p*
u (for this range of prices, no consumer will stay at Firm 1 without searching Firm 2).  As31
shown by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), D1 as given by (A4) is logconcave under assumption A1.
Furthermore, we know that in the benchmark model, the equilibrium price p*
n is less than p*
u.  By
logconcavity of D1, profit is logconcave and thus decreasing for all p1 > p*
n when the rival sets price p*
n.
Letting 
~ D()) = D1(p1,p*
u), it follows from Lemma A.1 that 
)
~ D'()) + 
~ D()) + p*
u
~ D'()) < 0,
i.e., profit is strictly decreasing for p1>p*
u when the rival sets p*
u.  Hence profit is decreasing for all p1 such
that  ^ x + ) > b, which is the parameter range under consideration.
There are two sub-cases to case (ii).  First consider x
^ < a,  meaning that no consumer will search
if the observed price at the first firm searched is equal to the price expected at the other firm.  Moreover,
if the putative equilibrium price, p*, were below y, then each firm's demand would be perfectly inelastic in
a neighborhood of p* so that profits could be increased by unilaterally raising price.  For p* = y, Firm 1's
demand is zero for a higher price and constant for a lower price, so the equilibrium is p* = y.   Now
consider the subcase p*
u > y.  If p* were below y, then Firm 1's profit derivative at p* as given by the left-
hand side of (3) would be positive (see (3) and recall p*<. p*
u, while D1 and D1' are independent of p*),
so again Firm 1 can gain by raising its price above p*.   If  p* = y such an upward deviation yields zero
profit; y is an equilibrium price since profit increases in price up to y by the concavity of profit established
for ) < 0 in part (i) above, in conjunction with the positive derivative of (3) at p* = y.
Finally case (iii) arises when c = (E, - a). Then, if Firm 2 charges an equilibrium price p* # y
(correctly anticipated by consumers), Firm 1's profit kinks at p1 = p*.  While the right derivative is still given
by (3), the left derivative is always 1/2 which is larger than what it would be for lower values of c (i.e.,
^ x>a). This is because a decrease in price does not lead to a higher demand from those consumers sampling
Firm 1 first (since Firm 1 gets all of them at p1 = p* anyway) and those consumers (of measure 1/2)
represent all of Firm 1's demand (since those sampling Firm 2 first do not engage in search either).  Since
the arguments in the proof for quasiconcavity of profit hold here for p1 $ p*, a necessary and sufficient
condition for p* to be an equilibrium price is that the left-hand side of (3) (which is the right derivative at
p1 = p*) be negative, which translates into p* $ 1/f(a). Q.E.D.32
Proof of Proposition 7:  Here we prove the existence of equilibrium for price-sensitive demand under the
assumption that the (per consumer) demand elasticity, 0, is decreasing in price (or, equivalently, increasing
in conditional surplus).  
For Case (i), the proof parallels the development of Propositions 3 and 4: we first prove equilibrium
existence for k = 0 and then extend the result to k > 0. Thus in Step 1 we show that R(v1)Du(v1,v*
u) is
quasiconcave and maximized at v*
u; in Step 2 we show that profit is quasiconcave in v1 and maximized at
v1 = v*
k for v2 = v*
k. For reference to the preceding cases, note that now ) = v*-v 1 (which is just the
generalization of the inelastic demand case).
Step 1. First note that the fraction of consumers buying from Firm 1 is 1-½[1-F(^ x)] when its surplus
satisfies )  # h = max{v*
u - v(0),a - ^ x} (all consumers who check out Firm 1 buy from it).  Over this range,
Firm 1's profit is decreasing in v1 since revenue per consumer, R, is decreasing in v1 (equivalently, revenue
increases with price since demand is inelastic for prices below the price corresponding to v*
u).  
For values of v1 such that )0[a-
^ x,b-^ x], the second derivative of D1 with respect to v1 is given by
the left-hand side of (A3), so that D1 is concave in v1 over this range for fN nonnegative on  [a,b].  Since
too R is concave in v1 (and also positive), profit is logconcave (as the product of logconcave functions) and
v1 = v*
u maximizes profit against v*
u for ) # b-
^ x.   It remains to be shown that profit is increasing in
v1 for ) > b-
^ x.  Over this range, the fraction of consumers buying from Firm 1 is given by the left-hand side
of (A4).  Moreover, v*
u is decreasing in the search cost, and so is lower than when the search cost is zero.
let v*
n denote the equilibrium level of surplus when search costs are zero.  Since profit is logconcave for no
search costs (D1 is logconcave, R is concave and positive and hence logconcave, and the product of
logconcave functions is logconcave), profit is increasing with v1 for v1 < v*
n.  It thus suffices to show that the
latter property implies that profit is increasing with v1 for v1 < v*
u when the rival charges v*
u.  That is, we must
show that when R(v1)
~ D()) is increasing for  v1 < v*
n with ) = v*
n - v1, then it is increasing for v1 < v*
u with
)= v*
u - v1, given that v*
u # v*
n (see also Lemma A.1).  Since the condition for profit to be increasing in v1
is R'/R - 
~ D'/~
D > 0, the desired result follows since R is concave in v1 (and hence R'/R is decreasing in v1),
and 
~ D'/~ D is increasing in v1 since 
~ D is logconcave.  33
Step 2. As in Step 1, profit is increasing for v1 sufficiently large. Here it is increasing for )  # h = max{v*
k -
v(0),a - ^ x}.
Now consider ) 0 [a - 
^ x,c].  We then have D1 = (1 - k)Du + k/2.  Arguments similar to those
used in the proof of Proposition 4 show that this is a logconcave function of v1. Then the logconcavity of
profit follows from an argument analogous to that used in Step 1 for  ) 0 [a - ^ x, b - ^ x]. We now show that
profit is rising in v1 for higher ) on both informed and uninformed consumers thus establishing that profit
is quasiconcave.
As in Proposition 4, for ) > c the proportion of informed consumers staying with Firm 1 starts
falling.  The argument used in Step 1 (where all consumers are uninformed) may be applied again here to
show that profit from informed consumers is then increasing in v1.  To see this note that here the fraction
of informed consumers staying with Firm 1 is 
~ D() - c), where 
~ D has the same functional form as there (it
is the fraction buying from Firm 1 when search costs are 0 and conditional surpluses are v1 at Firm 1 and
v*
k - c at Firm 2). 
It is now shown that profit from uninformed consumers is increasing in v1 for ) > c,  Since for )
= 0, overall profit has a zero derivative with respect to v1 and, since v*
k > v(pm), profit from informed
consumers is decreasing in v1. Thus, profit from uninformed consumers must be increasing at ) = 0. Since
it was shown in Step 1 that profit from uninformed consumers is logconcave in v1 for ) # b - ^ x, it must be
increasing for ) 0 [c,b - ^ x].  For ) > b - ^ x, profit is increasing in v1 using an argument similar to that used
at the end of Step 1.  This concludes the proof for case (i) since overall profit is increasing for ) $ c.
Arguments for cases (ii) and (iii) are analogous to those for Proposition 3.  Q.E.D.34
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